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Introduction 
Although we are fed a steady diet of ‘courtroom drama’ in popular 
culture, the reality of court is more banal. Jury trials are rare, most 
offenders plead guilty, and cases are routinely processed with 
bureaucratic and administrative gusto. If emotions are expressed, they 
generally take the form of seemingly contrived indignation of judges 
and lawyers during a sentencing hearing. Victims are sometimes invited 
to give impact statements in select cases, offenders rarely speak at all. 
This chapter will explore a very different type of justice 
encounter, one that puts the emotional expressions of victims, offenders, 
and community members at the centre of the interaction. Restorative 
justice involves bringing together people who have been affected by a 
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crime to take part in a discussion around what happened, how people 
were affected, and how to make things better. Implicit in this approach 
is a model of justice that reconceptualizes crime as an offence against a 
particular person or community, rather than simply a violation of state 
law (Christie 1977). If crime is about people as well as law, then justice 
should be about repairing relationships between those people in addition 
to more abstract notions of criminalization and desert. 
Restorative justice has been around since at least the 1970s in 
Western justice systems, though it arguably has roots in more ancient 
forms of dispute resolution (Braithwaite 2002a). Once conceived of as a 
‘new lens’ through which to view justice (Zehr 1990), it is increasingly 
seen as a complementary part of wider criminal justice (Hoyle 2012; 
Shapland et al. 2006). Today restorative justice practices can be found 
across most of the world. In England and Wales, the 2014 Restorative 
Justice Action Plan sets out an ambitious vision for the expansion of 
restorative justice, with the goal of ensuring restorative justice is 
available to victims of crime and at all stages of the criminal justice 
process, irrespective of the case, the offence, the offender’s age, or the 
location of the crime (Ministry of Justice 2014). Scotland also has a 
robust approach to restorative justice, with options available to victims 
of youth crime (Scottish Executive 2005) and limited diversion schemes 
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for adults (Kirkwood 2010). Northern Ireland has perhaps the most 
integrated and entrenched system for restorative justice, with the 2002 
Justice (Northern Ireland) Act providing a statutory basis for the use of 
restorative justice for nearly all types of youth offences (Jacobson and 
Gibbs 2009; Payne et al. 2010). Elsewhere around the world restorative 
justice has gained momentum with legislation, government initiatives, 
and NGOs providing some form of restorative justice across Australia 
and New Zealand, Europe, and North America (Galaway et al. 1996; 
Larsen 2014, Maxwell and Liu 2007). Promising restorative justice 
initiatives also lie outside the Western world, most notably the various 
peace-building activities in the Pacific Islands, the Middle East, and 
parts of Africa (Braithwaite 2002a; Braithwaite and Gohar 2014). 
It can be said with some confidence that restorative justice has 
now emerged as a mainstream option for victims and offenders for a 
range of offences and contexts across the world (London 2011; 
Shapland 2014). This is perhaps why of all the editions of the 
Handbook, this is the first to include a full chapter on restorative 
justice.1 On the other hand, it can also be seen as one of the more over-
hyped criminal justice initiatives in modern times. Even with significant 
                                                          
1 Restorative Justice was discussed in previous editions of the Oxford 
Handbook, in both Carolyn Hoyle’s and Lucia Zedner’s chapters on 
victims and the criminal justice process. 
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investment in restorative justice schemes around the world, case flow 
remains relatively low and support can be lukewarm (Rossner et al. 
2013; Shapland et al. 2011; Wigzell and Hough 2015). 
And yet restorative justice has proven enormously compelling to 
both criminologists and politicians (even Oprah Winfrey is an advocate, 
see Richards 2005). A particular strength is that it can appeal to both the 
political Right and Left, to victims’ organizations and to prison activists. 
This is perhaps because it can suit various, and at times conflicting, 
justice and political objectives: to empower victims, to reduce 
offending, to include communities in the justice process, to save money, 
and to reduce incarceration. It also stands out as a process that focuses 
on emotions and building social bonds in a criminal justice system that 
is increasingly bureaucratized and depersonalized (Garland 2001). 
Indeed, its popularity may stem from the fact that it provides a veneer of 
social cohesion that masks more oppressive criminal justice practices 
(Bottoms 2003). 
The rise of restorative justice in different contexts to suit 
different issues and ideologies has led to a significant amount of 
confusion and debate about what it actually is, and what it purports to 
do. One source of this confusion is that at times restorative justice is 
conceived of as a normative theory of how justice ought to be and at 
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other times it is limited to an explanatory account of a specific process 
(Braithwaite and Pettit 2000). This chapter seeks to clarify the 
normative and explanatory aspects of restorative justice as a social 
movement, practice, and criminological theory. This chapter examines 
competing definitions of restorative justice, the principles and goals that 
underlie it, the empirical research surrounding it, and the explanatory 
theories that seek to account for its successes and failures. It concludes 
by surveying the current sites of debate and tension within the 
restorative justice community, and the relationships between theory, 
research, policy, and practice. 
What is Restorative Justice? 
Defining a concept that has captured the imaginations of criminal justice 
practitioners and criminologists for many decades should be a relatively 
straightforward task. The term restorative justice has been used 
countless times as something of an omnibus term to describe various 
innovations in criminal justice. Practices include activities such as 
victim–offender mediation, family group conferences, restorative 
conferences, restorative cautions, sentencing circles, and community 
reparation boards. Given this diversity, it is not surprising that it has 
proved difficult to reach a consensus about its definition. This has 
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resulted in significant confusion, obfuscation, and contestation (Doolin 
2007; McCold 1998; Johnstone and Van Ness 2007).2 
One source of confusion is that restorative justice has been 
defined at times as a set of values and other times as a practice 
(Braithwaite 2002b; Marshall 1999; Wright 1991). It has been referred 
to by some scholars as ‘more of an idea, philosophy, set of values, or 
sensibility than a single and uniform set of practices of processes’ 
(Menkel-Meadow, 2007: 179). This approach is attractive in that it 
creates a wide umbrella for restorative practices. For this reason, 
Johnstone (2011) argues that those who seek to define restorative justice 
should focus on ‘the range of goals and values embodied in the practice 
of restorative justice’ rather than viewing restorative justice ‘simply as a 
new technique for controlling crime’ (2011: 5). From this perspective, 
the goal for the future of restorative justice is to ‘cement a common core 
of values and ethics’ (Shapland 2014: 124). 
                                                          
2 This debate goes well beyond the scope of this chapter. I am taking the 
relatively narrow conception of restorative justice as it is used in 
domestic criminal justice contexts. There are also restorative justice 
agendas in other organizational settings, most notably schools and 
workplaces (Johnstone, 2008). Restorative justice is also a concept 
associated with political reconciliation in post conflict societies, such as 
truth commissions and other peace building programmes. Restorative 
justice in domestic criminal justice may well be a different animal 
approaches taken in schools, workplaces, and in international human 
rights/ transitional justice. 
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Other scholars seek to define restorative justice as a specific 
practice or a procedure (McCold 2000). They argue that while it is 
important to articulate its underlying values and aspirations, restorative 
justice needs to be defined in concrete terms and ‘not [as] an alternative 
to retributive justice, not a new way of thinking about crime and justice, 
and not a set of aspirations for social change’ (Daly 2016: 5). One 
reason for this approach, most relevant to criminologists, is that defining 
it as a practice allows it to be subject to empirical inquiry. 
This approach is taken in the widely used definition by the 
Home Office researcher Tony Marshall: 
Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future. (Marshall 1999: 5). 
 
This definition has proliferated across the restorative justice world, and 
appears in most books and articles on the subject. The key element of 
this definition is that it is a practice (people ‘come together’ to ‘deal’ 
with something). This definition also includes a forward-looking 
element (dealing with ‘implications for the future’).3 However, Marshall 
prefaces his definition by stating that restorative justice ‘is not any 
particular practice, but a set of principles which may orientate the 
                                                          
3 For a thorough critique of this definition, see Dignan (2005). 
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general practice of any agency of group in relation to crime’ (1999: 5). 
This conflation of practice and principle has confused many. 
Embedded in Marshall’s definition is a second source of 
confusion about restorative justice. It has been variously defined as a 
process or an outcome (or both). A process-based definition stresses 
dialogue and cooperation. While most definitions include some 
description of a process, many also incorporate an emphasis on future 
outcomes. This is hinted at in the Marshall definition but not elaborated 
on. This can include a focus on ‘repairing the harm’ through apology, 
forgiveness, repayment, or some other symbolic or material reparation 
(Retzinger and Scheff 1996). 
For instance, the Ministry of Justice 2014 Action Plan for 
Restorative justice expands upon Marshall’s definition: 
The MoJ defines restorative justice as the process that brings 
those harmed by crime, and those responsible for the harm, into 
communication, enabling everyone affected by a particular 
incident to play a part in repairing the harm and finding a 
positive way forward (2014: 3). 
 
This definition incorporates elements of both process and outcomes. 
‘Repairing the harm’ may include apology/forgiveness, symbolic or 
material reparation, or some other form. ‘A positive way forward’ likely 
refers to a commitment on the part of the individual to stop offending. 
This is made more explicit in the definition given by the New South 
9 
 
Wales adult restorative justice programme, where participants ‘work 
together to find ways that can help heal the harm and help prevent the 
offender engaging in offending behaviour in the future’. (New South 
Wales Department of Justice). An outcomes-based definition is perhaps 
more inclusive, as it could include cases where victims are not willing to 
consent to a restorative justice process (Dignan 2003). 
It is certainly expected that positive outcomes will result from a 
restorative justice process. But a danger of including outcomes in a 
definition of restorative justice is that there is no clear reason why 
certain outcomes will be reached in all cases, particularly when the 
process is dominated by the unique needs and desires of different people 
in specific contexts. As restorative justice is mainstreamed there is a 
danger that a focus on on outcomes will come to dominate (Shapland 
2014), and lead to a one-size-fits-all model. For instance, offenders 
could be compelled to apologize, or victims to forgive, presenting a 
danger to the integrity of the practice. 
Recently, Daly has suggested that restorative justice is best 
defined as a justice mechanism (2016): 
Restorative justice is a contemporary justice mechanism to 
address crime, disputes, and bounded community conflict. The 
mechanism is a meeting (or several meetings) of affected 
individuals, facilitated by one or more impartial people. 
Meetings can take place at all phases of the criminal process, 
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pre-arrest, diversion from court, pre-sentence, and post-sentence, 
as well as for offending or conflicts not reported to the police. 
Specific practices will vary, depending on context, but are 
guided by rules and procedures that align with what is 
appropriate in the context of the crime, dispute, or bounded 
conflict (Daly 2016: 14). 
 
This is a rather useful definition, as it avoids the imprecision and 
confusion of alternative approaches.4 It is also a criminological 
definition, in that it can be used to develop an empirical agenda. In this 
definition, restorative justice is a practice and a process, not a value or 
an outcome. Certain values underpin the practice, and those values can 
and should be debated and adjusted in different contexts. Similarly, 
restorative justice processes are likely to have some kind of an outcome, 
but this will depend on the legal, procedural, and cultural context in 
which it takes place. Potential values and outcomes expand and contract 
in different situations; elements of the process remain the same.5 
                                                          
4 Note that this definition excludes practices that are sometimes 
included under the restorative justice umbrella, such as indigenous 
courts, problem solving courts, and truth commissions. It also presents a 
challenge to contemporary practices that might have been termed ‘partly 
restorative’ by McCold and Watchtel (2003), such as some forms of 
restorative cautioning and community justice panels. See Paterson and 
Clamp (2012) for more on this. Strang et al. (2013) similarly excludes 
these types of practices in their systematic review of restorative justice, 
as very few of them have undergone rigorous evaluations. 
5 An important caveat is that this process does not replace adversarial 
fact-finding. Some threshold of responsibility is a prerequisite to all 
restorative justice. This can mean that an offender pleads guilty or is 
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Furthermore, one can identify the core elements of the 
restorative justice mechanism. These core elements are: lay encounters, 
expressive narratives, and ritual dynamics. 
Lay Encounters 
A unique element of restorative justice practices is that they empower 
lay people- victims, offenders, families, friends, and community 
members- to actively participate in some kind of deliberative forum. In 
a well-known and enduring critique of contemporary criminal justice, 
Christie (1977) famously pointed out that criminal law and criminal 
procedure ‘steals’ conflict, and the power to deal with conflict, from 
those most affected by it. A criminal justice system that is dominated by 
professionalization and bureaucratization is less able to address the 
direct needs of victims, offenders, and communities (Garland 2001).6 
Restorative justice, on the other hand, is expressly designed to be a 
bottom-up encounter, where lay people interact with each other to 
                                                                                                                                            
found guilty in court, or in diversionary schemes it can mean that they 
admit responsibility prior to the restorative justice encounter (in New 
Zealand, the offender must ‘decline to deny’ the offence in order to be 
eligible). The starting point of restorative justice is a discussion of what 
happened, the details of which may or may not be contested, but this is 
substantively different from an examination/cross examination to 
determine ‘the facts’. 
6 Alternatively, one can interpret this ‘theft’ as relieving a burden. 
Victims are a diverse group, and some may not want the responsibility 
of dealing with the conflict or may be relieved that the state has stepped 
in. 
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address the specific impacts of a particular criminal offence or conflict. 
The main forms that this encounter can take include victim–offender 
mediation, family group conferencing, restorative justice conferencing, 
and circle sentencing. 
Victim–offender mediation involves an encounter between 
victim and offender, convened by a neutral third party facilitator. This 
model has evolved from various approaches mainly conentrated in 
North America and Europe. Family group conferencing and restorative 
justice conferencing arose out of practices developed in New Zealand 
and Australia and involve meetings between victims, offenders, and 
direct stakeholders such as family, friends, and respected community 
members. Circle sentencing, generally found in indigenous communities 
across North America, involves an encounter between a number of 
different stakeholders, including judges and other criminal justice 
officials, in a particular conflict (Johnstone 2011).7 
                                                          
7 Note here the distinction between circle sentencing and the broader 
concept of ‘indigenous courts’ or ‘indigenous justice’. Circle sentencing 
is a particular justice practice arising from North American indigenous 
communities that involves community members, victims, and offenders 
into a deliberative forum about how to address the harm of a particular 
offence or set of offences. This is outcomes focused, surely, but the 
unique justice mechanism is the restorative process. The larger concept 
of indigenous justice may contain elements of restorative justice but is 
not itself restorative. See Daly and Marchetti (2012) for more on this. 
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While lay people are at the centre of the restorative justice 
encounter, professionals always have, and will continue to have, an 
important role in the process. Restorative justice processes can include 
roles for facilitators, service providers, social workers, probation 
officers, and police. Professionals also participate ‘outside the circle’ 
with a complex web of criminal justice staff supporting the integration 
of restorative justice into the courts or other institutions. A burgeoning 
literature on ‘democratic professionalism’ suggest that professionals 
serve a vital role in meeting the needs of lay participants, but that 
effective collaboration requires a clear delineation of roles and tasks as 
well as an explicit set of shared goals (Dzur 2008; Rossner and Bruce, 
2016). 
Narrative/Expressive Elements 
The second defining element of a restorative justice mechanism is that it 
involves the creation and development of a narrative that articulates the 
voices of lay people. Indeed, restorative justice encounters are carefully 
designed and managed so that specific types of narratives emerge. Most 
processes rely on a variation of a ‘script’ where a facilitator first asks 
the offender to describe the events leading up to the offence and the 
details of the offence. Then the victim and other participants speak 
about how they have been affected by the offence. After a dialogue, the 
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facilitator will often return to the offender and ask how they have been 
affected by the offence and by what they have heard. 
This structure allows for intertwining narratives of 
accountability and harm to develop (Rossner et al. 2013). A narrative of 
harm allows the victim and other stakeholders to articulate the impact of 
an offence in their own words. A narrative of accountability allows the 
offender to acknowledge the harm that has been caused, accept 
responsibility, and express remorse. In these narratives, a range of 
emotions can be expressed, including anger, fear, anxiety, shame, guilt, 
remorse, and hope. This expressive dimension, expressed through these 
narratives, is a particularly compelling part of restorative justice 
(Freiberg 2001; Sherman 2003). Indeed, the emotional element of 
restorative justice may be its defining characteristic. 
The types of narratives found in restorative justice encounters 
are rather different from the ‘hegemonic tales’ that dominate courtroom 
interactions (Ewick and Silbey 1995). While victims may be allowed to 
speak in court when providing a victim impact statement, this is not the 
same as a narrative that is co-produced, challenged, and negotiated over 
the course of an interaction, and reports of these events suggest that they 
may prove to be unsatisfactory encounters (Rock 2010). Offenders and 
community members are largely excluded from courtroom narratives. 
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When they do speak, they are obliged to use words and phrases foreign 
and unfamiliar to them (Carlen 1974; Ericson and Baranek 1982). In 
restorative justice everybody speaks, and facilitators are trained to 
encourage the expression of emotion. 
Ritual dynamics 
A final distinguishing feature of restorative justice concerns its ritual 
dynamics. It is widely acknowledged by sociologists and 
anthropologists that ritual plays an important role in social life 
(Durkheim 1995; Douglas 1984). As Durkheim pointed out over a 
century ago, rituals are important because they help one to make sense 
of a society’s collective values, morals, and symbols, and give structure, 
order, and dignity to otherwise shapeless social events. They also 
produce ‘collective effervescence’ or feelings of solidarity with others. 
In other words, rituals can help to create and sustain belief in a moral 
order (Collins 2004). 
Criminologists have noted that most criminal justice systems 
have developed increasingly sophisticated ‘degradation rituals’ to mark 
the guilt and punishment of an offender (Garfinkel 1956). However, 
unlike in other social institutions (such as education, the family, the 
military), criminal justice fails to provide corresponding ‘reintegration 
rituals’ that welcome an offender back into a moral community (Maruna 
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2011; also Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941). Restorative justice scholars 
have long suggested that it is a unique form of ritual that runs counter to 
the dynamics of other criminal justice interventions (Braithwaite and 
Mugford 1994; Zehr 1990). 
Theoretical perspectives on why ritual dynamics can account for 
success in restorative justice will be discussed later in this chapter. For 
now, it is useful to identify some elements of a restorative justice ritual 
that make it unique. This includes its staging, choreography, casting, 
scripting, and symbols. Dramaturgical metaphors abound in restorative 
justice, and provide a useful way of articulating the ritual elements. 
First, restorative justice has physical boundaries: participants usually sit 
in a circle, with no hierarchy and with clear delineations between who is 
part of the circle and who is an outsider. This sets it apart from an 
adversarial staging of a court. Second, facilitators make an effort to 
design a seating arrangement that both supports vulnerable parties and 
maximizes interaction (Rossner 2013). Third, in many forms of 
restorative justice, particularly conferencing models, much effort goes 
into identifying and encouraging a ‘community of care’ (McCold 2004). 
Facilitators are tasked with identifying the ‘right people’, a particularly 
challenging job in urban anomic environments (Shapland et al. 2011). 
The scripted nature of the practice, discussed in the previous section, 
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means that most encounters follow roughly similar trajectories. Finally, 
the process usually results in some kind of agreement. These ‘outcome 
agreements’, reflect the consensus of the participants and detail steps the 
offender will take to ‘repair the harm’. They are usually written down 
and signed by all present. 
When restorative justice is viewed as a justice mechanism 
marked by lay encounters, narratives, and ritual, this can allow for both 
consistency and variations within the process, to suit the needs and the 
contexts of particular conflicts and particular people (Shapland 2014). 
For instance, a restorative justice conference between the offender and 
victim of serious sexual assault (Miller and Iovanni 2013) or homicide 
(Walters 2015) may look and feel very different from a conference 
between a juvenile offender and a local shop owner in a theft case. 
There will be variation in the process in terms of the amount and type of 
preparation, the staging, and the way that risk is assessed. But the 
emphasis on lay people speaking, room for emotional expression, and 
ritual dynamics remain the same. 
Restorative Values, Principles, and Standards 
While restorative justice may be defined as a justice mechanism, it is 
clear that certain values, principles, and standards underpin the process 
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(Braithwaite 2002b; Johnstone 2011; Roche 2003; Van Ness 2003).8 
Braithwaite supplies a comprehensive framework for identifying 
different types of standards and principles that ought to permeate a 
restorative justice practice (2002b), distinguishing between procedural 
standards and standards that are an outcome or an end state (Strang and 
Braithwaite 2000). This distinction between procedural and outcome 
standards is particularly useful when it comes time to evaluate the 
success of restorative justice. 
First, Braithwaite identifies constraining standards, such as 
empowerment, non-domination, and accountability.9 These standards 
form the basis of any restorative practice and must be honoured and 
enforced as ‘fundamental procedural safeguards’ (Braithwaite 2003: 8). 
These are procedural standards: their violation becomes immediately 
apparent during a restorative justice encounter and should not be 
tolerated. 
                                                          
8 Although a value, a principle, and a standard are all slightly different 
concepts, they tend to be used interchangeably in the restorative justice 
literature. 
9 The full list of constraining standards includes: non domination; 
empowerment; honouring upper limits on sanctions; respectful listening; 
equal concern for all stakeholders; accountability; appealability; and 
respect for fundamental human rights as outlined in international 
declarations and conventions. 
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The second category consists of maximizing standards, including 
restoration of relationships, emotional restoration, and the prevention of 
future injustice, often interpreted as the reduction of offending.10 These 
are end-state standards, and they are consistent with what victims and 
offenders say they want out of such a practice (Strang 2002). While 
constraining standards must always be honoured, achievement of 
maximizing standards is conditional on the contexts, desires, and 
capabilities of the parties. If appropriate they should be encouraged, but 
not mandated. This list provides useful metrics by which to evaluate the 
success of restorative justice, working with the hypothesis that 
restorative justice processes are more likely to achieve these standards 
than traditional court practices. 
The final category consists of emergent standards, including 
remorse, apology, censure of the act, and forgiveness.11 These principles 
are no less important than the maximizing standards, but they differ in 
key conceptual ways. While maximizing standards can be actively 
encouraged during a restorative justice encounter, emergent standards 
                                                          
10 The full list of maximizing standards includes: restoration of human 
dignity; property loss, safety, damaged relationships, communities, the 
environment, freedom, compassion or caring, peace, a sense of duty as a 
citizen; emotional restoration; provision of social support to develop 
human capabilities; and the prevention of future injustice. 
11 The full list of emergent standards includes: remorse over injustice; 
apology; censure of the act; forgiveness; and mercy. 
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should only arise organically. For instance, a victim of crime should 
never be required to express forgiveness just as an offender should 
never be compelled to show remorse, as this would violate the 
constraining standards of non-domination and empowerment. Like 
maximizing standards, emergent standards provide metrics by which 
one can evaluate restorative justice processes. 
Taken together, these restorative justice principles complement a 
republican theory of justice stressing non-domination and freedom 
(Braithwaite and Petit 1990). They articulate certain normative 
principles about how justice ought to be done. Explanatory theories of 
how restorative justice works in practice gives credence to the 
normative assertions. In this way, normative and explanatory theories 
are integrated: we progressively refine restorative justice values as we 
do more empirical research (Braithwaite 2003). Republicanism sets out 
a vision for justice, and the growing empirical research base helps to 
refine the practice to meet that vision, however imperfectly. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between the restorative 
justice mechanism and restorative justice standards. Constraining 
standards are at the base of the pyramid and they are what every 
restorative justice encounter is built upon. The restorative justice 
mechanism is a specific practice and its key elements are encounters 
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between lay people, an emphasis on expressive narratives, and ritual 
dynamics. Outcomes of restorative justice are maximizing and emergent 
standards, such as restoration, prevention of future injustice, expressions 
of remorse and forgiveness, and others. A restorative justice mechanism 
will not guarantee these outcomes but advocates hypothesise that such 
standards are more likely to be met in a restorative justice process than 
other criminal justice processes. 
 
Figure 1. Defining Restorative Justice 
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Explanatory Theories of How Restorative Jutie Works 
A number of criminological theories attempt to account for some of the 
claims made by restorative justice advocates. The three main 
approaches include: shame theories, procedural justice theories, and 
interaction ritual theory. 
Shame Theories 
As explored earlier, one of the key elements of the restorative justice 
mechanism is the expression of emotion in narrative form. While a 
range of emotions are relevant to restorative justice theory, such as guilt, 
remorse, and empathy (Harris 2003; Harris et al. 2004; Van Stokkom 
2002), shame is the central emotion around which most theory is built. 
Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory is the most well-known 
theoretical foundation for restorative justice. Though mention of 
restorative justice does not appear in Braithwaite’s ground-breaking 
Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (1989), practitioners, advocates, and 
scholars quickly embraced the book’s central concepts, such as the now-
classic distinction between stigmatic and reintegrative shaming. 
Braithwaite demonstrates how most criminal justice processes and 
sanctions shame an offender in a way that is stigmatizing, condemning 
not just the wrongdoing but the individual herself. Reintegrative 
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shaming, on the other hand, is a respectful process where disapproval of 
the criminal act is expressed but offenders are given a chance to express 
remorse and can then be welcomed back into a moral community. While 
stigmatic shaming can have long-term negative impacts on an 
individual, reintegrative shaming will theoretically strengthen social 
bonds and internally build a conscience that prevents future 
wrongdoing. This theory has been widely used by academics and 
practitioners to explain the mechanisms of restorative justice. In later 
works, Braithwaite connects reintegrative shaming theory to a 
restorative normative framework, identifying reintegrative shaming as 
an explanatory dynamic that can explain how remorse, apology, 
forgiveness, censure, mercy and other values may arise in restorative 
justice (2002a). 
Other scholars shift the focus from the external act of shaming to 
the internal process of feeling ashamed. Scheff and Retzinger (2001) 
argue that shame is a repressed emotion in contemporary society and 
can often go unacknowledged. This leads to further shame about feeling 
ashamed, resulting in a cycle of aggression, anger, dysfunctional 
patterns of communication, and violence. According to Sheff and 
Retzinger, these negative consequences can simply be avoided if shame 
is acknowledged. A restorative justice conference, for example, can 
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theoretically bring shame to the surface in a way that redirects 
aggressive emotions. When offenders and victims are both able to 
acknowledge any shame they might feel, this can lead to some kind of 
symbolic reparation and reintegration, usually through the expression of 
remorse and forgiveness (Retzinger and Scheff 1996). In later works, 
Braithwaite and colleagues incorporate elements of unacknowledged 
shame into a broader theory of restorative justice, shaming, and shame 
management, suggesting that in addition to making sure restorative 
justice encounters are reintegrative and not stigmatizing, one must bring 
shame to the surface in a positive way (Ahmed et al. 2001; Harris and 
Maruna 2006). 
Procedural Justice Theory 
Reintegrative shaming theory implies that shame needs to be coupled 
with respectful treatment. This is the heart of procedural justice theory, 
which asserts that if citizens feel that their treatment at the hands of 
authority figures is fair, inclusive, and respectful, they are more likely to 
obey the law (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002). 
Defiance theory incorporates elements of reintegrative shaming, 
unacknowledged shame, and procedural justice to argue that similar 
criminal sanctions have different effects for offenders in different social 
situations (Sherman 1993). Defiance occurs when an offender views a 
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sanction as illegitimate, has weak bonds to the sanctioning agent, or 
denies his or her shame in the offence. Deterrence, on the other hand, 
can result if the sanctions are regarded as legitimate, offenders express 
shame for their actions, and they have strong bonds with mainstream 
society. 
The voluntary nature, deliberative structure, and encouragement 
of stakeholder participation can lead to increased perceptions of 
fairness, legitimacy, and social bonding. If restorative justice is 
perceived to be fairer than going to court, then it theoretically follows 
that restorative justice will encourage compliance with the law, thus 
preventing future injustices. 
Interaction Ritual Theory 
Procedural justice and shame theories make claims about how the 
process of restorative justice will lead to desired outcomes. However 
they don’t specify precisely how feeling shame, fairness, or trust brings 
about such outcomes. A final theoretical perspective focuses on the 
micro-level elements of producing a successful ritual. Interaction ritual 
theory draw on a long tradition in sociology and anthropology arguing 
that one’s sense of morals, community bonds, and the self are a function 
of the rituals in which one partakes, both sacred and profane (Collins 
2004; Durkheim 1912). 
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The restorative justice ritual brings together victims and 
offenders, their emotions, and their stories to produce solidarity and 
other conciliatory emotions (Rossner 2013). In particular, ritual theory 
posits that by bringing people together in a face-to-face encounter with 
clear barriers to outsiders and a shared focus of attention, a certain 
rhythm will build up between participants as they become more in sync 
with each other’s emotions and perspectives. This rhythm will lead to 
people feeling connected to each other, in a kind of Durkheimian 
‘collective effervescence’ (Collins 2004). Solidarity and shared emotion 
may then be demonstrated through expressions of apology and 
forgiveness, and symbolic integration through handshakes, eye contact, 
and hugs (Rossner 2011). This is a particularly striking type of ritual 
when one considers the asymmetrical degradation rituals of court 
(Carlen 1976; Rock 1993). In theory, the micro-level production of 
solidarity and shared emotion provides restorative justice with the 
unique power to achieve its standards and goals. 
While these theories can help explain why restorative justice 
might achieve successful outcomes, they can also account for its 
failures. A worry is that restorative justice can become another form of 
degradation ritual, marked by stigmatic shaming, unfair processes, and 
coercion (Braithwaite and Mugford 1994). As theoretical, empirical, and 
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normative accounts of restorative justice develop, an examination of 
both what works and what does not can help to clarify theory, improve 
standards, and enhance practice. 
Empirical 
Restorative justice has been subject to an enormous amount of empirical 
research, perhaps more than any other criminal justice innovation in 
recent history (Strang and Sherman 2015). Much of the research 
examines restorative justice as a diversion or a supplement to court and 
focuses on outcomes such as restoration, fairness, legitimacy, and future 
offending, largely mapping onto the maximizing and emergent 
principles articulated by Braithwaite. Whereas early research tended not 
to include a control group or to utilize matched controls, a growing body 
of research now draws on randomized controlled trials (Sherman et al. 
2015b). Responding to calls for more in-depth analysis of the process 
and dynamics of restorative justice (Braithwaite 2002a), there is also a 
sizable qualitative literature drawing on observations and interviews that 
looks more closely at the actual practices of restorative justice. This 
research includes a focus on facilitation and staging (Bruce 2013; 
Bolitho 2015), power (Cook 2006), emotions (Rossner 2011), language 
(Hayes and Snow 2013), and others. A small number of studies have 
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examined how the dynamics of conferences influence outcomes (Hayes 
and Daly 2003; Hipple et al. 2014, 2015; Rossner 2013). 
Participant Experiences with Restorative Justice 
Braithwaite’s constraining standards include respect, accountability, 
empowerment, and non domination. His maximizing and emergent 
standards include concepts such as restoration, apology, and 
forgiveness. Extant research suggests that all of these are experienced, 
on average, in greater quantities by participants in restorative justice 
conferences compared to those whose cases end up in traditional courts. 
Research from the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada suggests that both offenders and victims perceive restorative 
justice as fairer, more satisfying, and more legitimate than that which is 
offered in the courtroom. Offenders who participate in restorative 
justice have a better understanding of what is happening, are more 
actively involved in their case, and are more likely to report that they 
are treated with respect and fairness (Barnes et al. 2015; Morris and 
Maxwell 1998; Tyler et al. 2007; Umbreit et al. 1994). Restorative 
justice conferences can also result in a higher frequency—and larger 
amounts—of restitution paid to victims (Strang 2002; Umbreit et al. 
2004). 
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In a comprehensive study of restorative justice for British 
offenders, Shapland and colleagues (2007) reported that the large 
majority of victims and offenders found their conferences to be useful, 
felt a sense of closure, and were more satisfied with their procedures 
than those who went to court. Notably, those whose offences were most 
serious were significantly more likely to find their conference useful 
compared to those who committed less serious offences. 
Research from Australia examining the role of shame in 
restorative justice reports that offenders who participate in restorative 
justice conferences experience both reintegrative and stigmatic shame in 
higher quantities than offenders who go to court (Ahmed et al. 2001). 
This suggests that while restorative justice can maximize positive 
emotions, it can also provide a space for more harmful processes. All 
emotions, both positive and negative, have the potential to be amped up 
in such intensive encounters. 
Healing victims 
There is clear evidence that restorative justice is beneficial to victims of 
crime. Symbolic reparation, generally in the form of an apology, is often 
important to victims’ satisfaction levels. Victims who meet their 
offender and receive an apology are more forgiving, feel more 
sympathetic towards the offender, and are less likely to desire physical 
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revenge (Sherman and Strang 2011). Similarly, Poulson’s (2003) review 
of restorative justice evaluations illustrates a range of positive 
psychological outcomes for victims. 
Randomized trials in Great Britain which built on Strang’s 
(2002) work provide strong evidence of increased well-being for victims 
who meet with their offender (Shapland et al. 2007; Strang et al. 2006). 
This is confirmed by Angel et al. (2014) who analyse Post Traumatic 
Stress (PTS) symptoms in victims of crime randomly assigned to a 
restorative justice conference or a control and find significantly reduced 
levels of PTS symptoms immediately following a conference. The 
authors also report that women suffer more post-traumatic stress 
symptoms after a crime, but also benefit more from restorative justice 
than men. 
A minority of victims and offenders feel worse after a 
conference, specifically when they reported not being involved or 
disrespected when reaching an outcome (Morris and Maxwell 1993; 
Strang 2002). Similarly, Shapland et al. (2007) found that the minority 
of participants that were unhappy with their conference pointed to 
instances where they felt they were not being taken seriously, or that 
they felt uninformed or not included in a follow-up after the conference. 
Finally, Choi et al. (2012) point out that when victims are unhappy with 
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their experience of restorative justice it is often when they feel little 
attention has been paid to the process and most of the focus is on 
developing suitable outcomes for the offender. Although such cases are 
greatly outnumbered by those with positive outcomes, they do highlight 
the links between the conference dynamics and subsequent satisfaction. 
Victims and offenders do not always feel that they can tell their story, 
develop rapport, or acheive solidarity. When elements of the process go 
wrong, participants can leave the interaction leaving worse. 
Reducing reoffending 
The best research on restorative justice and reoffending shows a modest 
but consistent positive effect on recidivism reduction. Due to the many 
challenges of adequate implementation and evaluation, much research 
on restorative justice and recidivism has been hindered by the lack of an 
adequate comparison group, little statistical power, or other 
methodological issues (Weatherburn and Macadam 2013). The most 
rigorous evaluations of restorative justice employ either a randomized or 
matched control group for comparison and suggests that restorative 
justice can reduce future injustices by both reducing reoffending and 
saving money. 
A thorough review of the early evidence on restorative justice 
appeared in Braithwaite (2002a), with cautiously optimistic conclusions 
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about its effectiveness. Since then, a number of meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews have attempted to address some of the 
methodological limitations of previous research by pooling data to look 
at trends in results (Bonta et al. 2006; Bradshaw and Roseborough 
2005; Bradshaw et al. 2006; Latimer et al. 2005). Though the impact of 
restorative justice on recidivism varies by degree, all studies conclude 
that restorative justice, compared to court, results in a modest reduction 
in offending. There is also evidence of secondary deterrence in a 
reduced desire for revenge by victims, thus potentially preventing future 
retaliatory crimes (Strang 2002). Most recently, Strang et al. (2013) 
report on a systematic review of the most rigorous randomized 
controlled trials of restorative justice. Across 10 experiments, they 
found an overall positive impact on the frequency recidivism. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows some support for the argument that 
restorative justice is more effective for violent crime than it is for 
property crime, and for adult offenders over young offenders. While the 
effect sizes of these analyses are not large, they are contrary to 
conventional wisdom and standard practice, which frames restorative 
justice as most suitable for low-level, juvenile property crimes 
(Sherman et al, 2015a, see also Wood and Suzuki 2016). This finding is 
supported by Rossner (2013) who finds that individuals with more, and 
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more serious, previous convictions are more likely to benefit from 
restorative justice conferences than first time offenders. 
There is also strong evidence to suggest that restorative justice 
conferencing is a cost-effective approach to reducing crime. Shapland 
and colleagues (2008) utilize innovative measures to examine the cost 
of crime and the impact of restorative justice, finding significant savings 
(in terms both of criminal justice processing costs and of the costs of 
reconvictions) for every £1 spent on delivering restorative justice 
conferences. 
Like most criminal justice innovations, restorative justice suffers 
from a ‘heterogeneity problem’ (Braithwaite 2014), as not all restorative 
justice processes can be guaranteed to meet the high bar of maximizing 
and emergent standards. Indeed, a major flaw in much of the thinking 
around restorative justice is that it ‘holds out the promise that these 
things should happen most of the time when research suggests that these 
things can occur some of the time’ (Daly 2003: 234). As such, it is 
useful to compare not only restorative justice to court, but to examine 
variations within restorative justice conferences. An analysis of within-
conference variations shows that offending is less likely when offenders 
were remorseful and the outcome agreement was decided by general 
consensus (Hayes and Daly 2003). Similarly, Shapland and colleagues 
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(2008) report that decreases in offending are most likely when offenders 
reported that the conference helped them realize the harm done, that 
they found it was useful, that they wanted to meet the victim, and when 
they were observed to be actively participating in the conference. Hipple 
et al. (2014, 2015) report similar results: conferences that observers 
reported to be ‘restorative’ resulted in less offending, both in the short 
and long term. Rossner (2013) analyses the ritual dynamics of 
restorative justice conferences, comparing the reoffending frequencies 
for offenders who participated in emotionally intense and high solidarity 
conferences with offenders who participated in less intense conferences, 
finding that offenders in the former category offended at a much lower 
frequency, even five years after their conference (see also Sherman et 
al. 2015b). 
To conclude, the research on restorative justice conferencing and 
reoffending suggests that it is right to be optimistic about this process. 
However, there are important caveats to be made. First, restorative 
justice seems to be most effective when it meets constraining, 
maximizing, and emergent standards. Not all conferences achieve 
restoration, reparation, or reductions in offending and we should not 
expect them to. Second, these principles are most likely to be met in 
cases with more serious crime, with adult offenders, and where the 
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emotional intensity is high. Such conferences are harder to organize, 
more time consuming, more politically risky, and more expensive, but 
may be the most effective.12 Third, the evidence base is largely limited 
to tests of the conferencing model, including face-to-face meetings 
between victims, offenders, and other stakeholders (Sherman et al. 
2015a). One should be cautious about generalizing these findings to less 
intensive interventions. For instance, a common practice for police in 
the UK is to deliver a ‘street level restorative justice’, where a person 
might be cautioned in a restorative matter by a police officer on the spot 
after being apprehended. The offender might be asked to think about 
harm and making amends, but victims and other stakeholders are not 
usually involved (Hoyle et al. 2002; Paterson and Clamp 2012). While 
practices such as restorative cautioning might meet the standards and 
values set out by Braithwaite (2002b), their effects have not been 
rigorously measured. There is a danger that research about restorative 
conferencing is being used as an evidence base for related but 
fundamentally different models operating under the same ‘restorative’ 
banner. 
 
                                                          
12 Maxwell and Morris (2001) have similarly argued that since high 
quality restorative justice is so resource-intensive, practices should 
focus on persistent serious offenders. 
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Restorative Justice as Punishment 
Beyond the many empirical questions about the effects of restorative 
justice, there are also a great many normative debates about the value of 
restorative practices for society. One current debate of relevance to 
criminologists and criminal law scholars centres on whether restorative 
justice can meet the punitive aims of criminal justice. This is 
particularly important in the current political context, where restorative 
justice is positioned as a mainstream option for offenders and victims. 
Early advocates of restorative practices, often connected to 
prison abolition movements, argued that restorative justice was a new 
paradigm of justice that could entirely replace contemporary adversarial 
and retributivist criminal justice practices (Zehr 1990). Restorative 
justice was asserted to be the opposite of ‘punitive justice’ or 
‘retributive justice’. Such radical claims helped to articulate restorative 
values, distinguish it from ‘business as usual’, and publicize the 
concept. But there was significant disagreement about this, including 
critiques from criminal justice practitioners who sought to incorporate 
restorative justice into their existing practice and from criminal law 
theorists who challenged the retributive–restorative dichotomy (Daly 
2002; Duff 2003; Zedner 1994). Indeed, Daly (2012) has suggested that 
‘the retributive-restorative oppositional contrast stalled a more 
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sophisticated conceptual development of restorative justice in its 
formative years’ (2012: 358). Rather than simply dismiss punishment as 
an illegitimate goal of criminal justice, punishment needs to be taken 
seriously, both as a theoretical construct and a social institution (see 
Garland 1990). 
Instead of an alternative to punishment, restorative justice can be 
seen as an ‘alternative punishment’ (Duff 1992). One reason for this that 
it places certain obligations, and some pains, upon offenders (Daly 
2002). However, Walgrave (2008) has argued that such pain cannot be 
punitive, as it is not inflicted to meet retributive goals. Retributive 
punishment is the intentional infliction of pain, whereas in a restorative 
justice context pain is merely a byproduct, such as the pain resulting 
from feelings of remorse. Duff (2003), critiques restorative justice 
scholars for their myopic focus on the harm of crime, arguing that in 
order to meet the standard of criminal responsibility, an offence must 
also be seen as morally wrong. While harm can be repaired through 
symbolic or material reparation, in Duff’s view a wrong must be 
addressed retributively, through acts of censure. Restorative justice may 
be an ideal outlet for such censure, and can therefore satisfy retributive 
aims. Similarly, London (2011) argues that restorative justice should 
have a retributive element in order to promote trust and legitimacy. This 
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view is also reflected in social psychological experiments, where 
participants preferred restorative processes that contained retributive 
elements, particularly for serious crime (Gromet and Darley 2006). 
Whether or not the infliction of pain is intentional, and therefore 
punitive, many offenders report the experience of restorative justice as 
painful. Indeed, many say that apologizing to one’s victims is harder 
than going to court. Its proponents often emphasize that it is not a ‘soft 
option’ and is therefore a legitimate element of criminal justice 
(Johnstone 2011). There is also a growing jurisprudence of restorative 
justice, with courts in Canada and New Zealand concluding that 
restorative justice can meet retributivist aims through denunciation and 
censure (Foley 2014). 
Other areas of debate include whether restorative justice should 
be a diversion or supplement to prosecution (Gavrielides 2008), where it 
belongs in the criminal justice system (Shapland et al. 2011), its use for 
prisoners serving long sentences for serious crime (Bolitho 2015; Miller 
2011), its use in cases of sexual violence and family violence (Daly and 
Stubbs 2006; Ptacek 2009), and its relationship to indigenous justice 
(Daly 2002). While each of these areas merits a longer discussion, the 
constraints of this chapter prevent this. 
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The Future of Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice has been a part of criminal justice in England and 
Wales for a number of years, with provisions set out for youth justice, 
probation, and prisons (Crawford and Newburn 2003; Hoyle 2012). In 
recent years, it seems that restorative justice may be having another 
revival. There has been a flurry of statements, action plans, and 
legislation indicating that the 2010 Coalition government, and likely the 
2015 Conservative government, supports the integration of restorative 
justice in all stages of the criminal justice system (Collins 2015). A 
restorative justice action plan was published by the Ministry of Justice 
in 2012 and again in 2014 asserting the government’s commitment to 
the practice. Other notable milestones include the 2013 Code of Practice 
for Victims, stating that all victims of young offenders have a right to 
restorative justice, and victims of adult offenders have the right to learn 
about restorative justice and assess its appropriateness. These were not 
empty promises either; they were paired with a commitment to invest 
£29 million, channelled through local Police and Crime Commissioners, 
into the provision of restorative justice at the local level. At the same 
time, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 provides statutory support for 
restorative justice at the pre-sentence stage, allowing courts to defer 
sentence to allow restorative justice to take place. There is also recent 
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investment in Neighborhood Justice Panels to tackle low-level crime, a 
new Rehabilitation Activity Requirement introduced in community and 
suspended sentences with restorative justice as an option, and a 
pathfinder programme investigating the use of restorative justice at the 
pre-sentence stage in select crown courts. While this ambitious set of 
strategies is promising, its current implementation has been more 
piecemeal (Wright 2015). In an effort to bring some structure to a 
disparate set of practices and policies, the Restorative Justice Council, 
an independent third sector membership body advocating for restorative 
practice, has developed its own statement of principles and a Restorative 
Service Quality Mark which restorative justice programmes nationwide 
can seek to obtain. 
Elsewhere around the world restorative justice has continued to 
benefit from continued investment. The jurisdictions with the most 
coordinated and successful efforts are New Zealand and Northern 
Ireland. New Zealand has completely transformed its juvenile justice 
system over 25 years to one where every effort is made to divert cases 
out of the courts into restorative justice conferencing, regardless of the 
seriousness of the offence or the history of the offender. There is less 
support however for restorative justice in adult cases. One reason for 
this is the different way restorative justice is incorporated into 
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legislation. The 1989 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
effectively mandates restorative justice as a first option of all young 
offenders. In the case of adults, support for restorative justice appears in 
three different acts (the Sentencing Act 2002, Parole Act 2002, and the 
Victims’ Rights Act 2002), but only encourages its use in vague terms. 
The story is similar in Northern Ireland. Originating out of community 
restorative justice schemes developed to deal with paramilitary violence, 
the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 legislated restorative justice 
conferences for all young offenders, either as a diversion or as part of a 
court order. There is no legislative basis for adult restorative justice in 
Northern Ireland, but there are a growing number of schemes run 
through probation and victims’ services. 
There are three observations to be made about this recent 
upswing. First, the current mood is one in a long cycle that sees the 
popularity of, and the resources for, restorative justice ebb and flow in 
many jurisdictions. Restorative justice has been on the verge of ‘taking 
off’ since at least the 1980s and needs sustained support in order for this 
to be achieved. 
Second, as restorative justice practices expand, attention should 
be paid to the empirical base, which suggests that restorative justice 
conferences are more effective when they are emotionally intense 
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encounters, with victims and stakeholders present, and for more serious 
crimes with adult offenders. The best research to date has focused on the 
conferencing model, and caution should be advised when generalizing 
from this model to different restorative practices. Marshall warned of 
this, with much foresight, when he concluded: 
It is its ability to absorb many different concerns that gives it 
appeal, and it is its grounding in successful practice that gives it 
persuasive justification. In this lies its strength and weakness. 
There is a grave danger that Restorative Justice may end up 
being all things to all men and women, concealing important 
divergences of practice and aim. (1999: 30). 
 
Third, research into restorative justice has shown that it can be a 
success, but significant hurdles first need to be overcome. These 
include: maintaining referrals and case flow, ensuring cooperation 
between services (especially when it comes to data sharing), and 
upholding standards for training and practice to ensure high quality and 
consistent service. At the same time, a strength of restorative justice is 
its neutrality—too much integration within criminal justice can 
undermine this, as well as leading to net-widening, abuse, and 
unaccountability. Many of these issues have been addressed by 
providing a statutory basis for restorative justice. The experiences of 
Northern Ireland and New Zealand, where restorative justice has been 
formally incorporated into the youth justice system, are particularly 
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illustrative in this regard (for a more thorough discussion, see Shapland 
et al. 2008, 2011). Without a legislative basis the implementation and 
development of restorative justice relies on the leadership of local 
judges, legal professionals, and community activists. This is not enough 
to sustain its growth. In both New Zealand and Ireland, restorative 
justice has experienced significant support and success when it has a 
statutory basis. When it does not, as is the case for adults in both 
countries, its implementation is less impressive. In the face of growing 
evidence that restorative justice is most effective for adults and serious 
crime, its future as a mainstream component of the criminal justice 
system depends on statutory support. 
 
Selected Readings 
The best readings that provide comprehensive analysis of theory, 
research, and debates in restorative justice include Braithwaite’s 
Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002a); Johnstone’s 
Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, and Debates (2011); Cunneen and 
Hoyle’s, Debating Restorative Justice (2010); Von Hirsh et al.’s 
Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable 
Paradigms (2003); Johnstone and Van Ness’ Handbook of Restorative 
Justice (2007); Dignan’s Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice 
(2005); and the 2002 special issue on restorative justice in the British 
Journal of Criminology. Readings that include original empirical 
research on restorative justice can be found in Strang’s Repair or 
Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice (2002); Shapland et al.’s’ 
Restorative Justice in Practice (2011); Rossner’s, Just Emotions: 
Rituals of Restorative Justice (2013); Ahmed et al’s, Shame 
Management Through Reintegration (2001), Roche’s, Accountability in 
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Restorative Justice (2003); and Miller’s, After the Crime: The Power of 
Restorative Justice Dialogues Between Victims and Violent Offenders 
(2011). 
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